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A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely
speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing
unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insights that improve
our understanding of stable choice functions. In particular, (i) we show that
every stable choice function is generated by a unique simple choice function,
which never excludes more than one alternative, (ii) we completely charac-
terize which simple choice functions give rise to stable choice functions, and
(iii) we prove a strong relationship between stability and a new property of
tournament solutions called local reversal symmetry. Based on these findings,
we provide the first concrete tournament—consisting of 24 alternatives—in
which the tournament equilibrium set fails to be stable. Furthermore, we
prove that there is no more discriminating stable tournament solution than
the bipartisan set and that the bipartisan set is the unique most discrimi-
nating tournament solution which satisfies standard properties proposed in
the literature.
1. Introduction
Given a set of alternatives and binary non-transitive preferences over these alternatives,
how can we consistently choose the “best” elements from any feasible subset of alterna-
tives? This question has been studied in detail in the literature on tournament solutions
(see, e.g., Laslier, 1997; Hudry, 2009; Moser, 2015; Brandt et al., 2016). The lack of tran-
sitivity is typically attributed to the independence of pairwise comparisons as they arise
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in sports competitions, multi-criteria decision analysis, and preference aggregation.1 In
particular, the pairwise majority relation of a profile of transitive individual preference
relations often forms the basis of the study of tournament solutions. This is justified by
a theorem due to McGarvey (1953), which shows that every tournament can be induced
by some underlying preference profile. Many tournament solutions therefore correspond
to well-known social choice functions such as Copeland’s rule, Slater’s rule, the Banks
set, and the bipartisan set.
Over the years, many desirable properties of tournament solutions have been proposed.
Some of these properties, so-called choice consistency conditions, make no reference to
the actual tournament but only relate choices from different subtournaments to each
other. An important choice consistency condition, that goes under various names, re-
quires that the choice set is invariant under the removal of unchosen alternatives. In
conjunction with a dual condition on expanded feasible sets, this property is known as
stability (Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011). Stability implies that choices are made in a
robust and coherent way. Furthermore, stable choice functions can be rationalized by a
preference relation on sets of alternatives.
Examples of stable tournament solutions are the top cycle, the minimal covering set,
and the bipartisan set. The latter is elegantly defined via the support of the unique mixed
maximin strategies of the zero-sum game given by the tournament’s skew-adjacency ma-
trix. Curiously, for some tournament solutions, including the tournament equilibrium
set and the minimal extending set, proving or disproving stability turned out to be ex-
ceedingly difficult. As a matter of fact, whether the tournament equilibrium set satisfies
stability was open for more than two decades before the existence of counterexamples
with about 10136 alternatives was shown using the probabilistic method.
Brandt (2011) systematically constructed stable tournament solutions by applying a
well-defined operation to existing (non-stable) tournament solutions. Brandt’s study was
restricted to a particular class of generating tournament solutions, namely tournament
solutions that can be defined via qualified subsets (such as the uncovered set and the
Banks set). For any such generator, Brandt (2011) gave sufficient conditions for the
resulting tournament solution to be stable. Later, Brandt et al. (2017) showed that for
one particular generator, the Banks set, the sufficient conditions for stability are also
necessary.
In this paper, we show that every stable choice function is generated by a unique
underlying simple choice function, which never excludes more than one alternative. We
go on to prove a general characterization of stable tournament solutions that is not re-
stricted to generators defined via qualified subsets. As a corollary, we obtain that the
sufficient conditions for generators defined via qualified subsets are also necessary. Fi-
nally, we prove a strong connection between stability and a new property of tournament
solutions called local reversal symmetry. Local reversal symmetry requires that an alter-
native is chosen if and only if it is unchosen when all its incident edges are inverted. This
result allows us to settle two important problems in the theory of tournament solutions.
1Due to their generality, tournament solutions have also found applications in unrelated areas such as
biology (Schjelderup-Ebbe, 1922; Landau, 1951; Slater, 1961; Allesina and Levine, 2011).
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We provide the first concrete tournament—consisting of 24 alternatives—in which the
tournament equilibrium set violates stability. Secondly, we prove that there is no more
discriminating stable tournament solution than the bipartisan set. We also axiomati-
cally characterize the bipartisan set by only using properties that have been previously
proposed in the literature. We believe that these results serve as a strong argument in
favor of the bipartisan set if choice consistency is desired.
2. Stable Sets and Stable Choice Functions
Let U be a universal set of alternatives. Any finite non-empty subset of U will be called
a feasible set. Before we analyze tournament solutions in Section 4, we first consider a
more general model of choice which does not impose any structure on feasible sets. A
choice function is a function that maps every feasible set A to a non-empty subset of A
called the choice set of A. For two choice functions S and S′, we write S′ ⊆ S, and say
that S′ is a refinement of S and S a coarsening of S′, if S′(A) ⊆ S(A) for all feasible
sets A. A choice function S is called trivial if S(A) = A for all feasible sets A.
Brandt (2011) proposed a general method for refining a choice function S by defining
minimal sets that satisfy internal and external stability criteria with respect to S, similar
to von-Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in cooperative game theory.2
A subset of alternatives X ⊆ A is called S-stable within feasible set A for choice
function S if it consists precisely of those alternatives that are chosen in the presence of
all alternatives in X. Formally, X is S-stable in A if
X = {a ∈ A : a ∈ S(X ∪ {a})}.
Equivalently, X is S-stable if and only if
S(X) = X, and (internal stability)
a /∈ S(X ∪ {a}) for all a ∈ A \X. (external stability)
The intuition underlying this formulation is that there should be no reason to restrict
the choice set by excluding some alternative from it (internal stability) and there should
be an argument against each proposal to include an outside alternative into the choice
set (external stability).
An S-stable set is inclusion-minimal (or simplyminimal) if it does not contain another
S-stable set. Ŝ(A) is defined as the union of all minimal S-stable sets in A. Ŝ defines a
choice function whenever every feasible set admits at least one S-stable set. In general,
however, neither the existence of S-stable sets nor the uniqueness of minimal S-stable
sets is guaranteed. We say that Ŝ is well-defined if every choice set admits exactly one
minimal S-stable set. We can now define the central concept of this paper.
Definition 1. A choice function S is stable if Ŝ is well-defined and S = Ŝ.
2This is a generalization of earlier work by Dutta (1988), who defined the minimal covering set as the
unique minimal set that is internally and externally stable with respect to the uncovered set (see
Section 4).
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Figure 1: Visualization of stability. A stable choice function S chooses a set from both B
(left) and C (middle) if and only if it chooses the same set from B ∪C (right).
The direction from the left and middle diagrams to the right diagram corre-
sponds to γ̂ while the converse direction corresponds to α̂.
Stability is connected to rationalizability and non-manipulability. In fact, every sta-
ble choice function can be rationalized via a preference relation on sets of alternatives
(Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011) and, in the context of social choice, stability and mono-
tonicity imply strategyproofness with respect to Kelly’s preference extension (Brandt,
2015).
The following example illustrates the preceding definitions. Consider universe U =
{a, b, c} and choice function S given by the table below (choices from singleton sets are
trivial and therefore omitted).
X S(X) Ŝ(X)
{a, b} {a} {a}
{b, c} {b} {b}
{a, c} {a} {a}
{a, b, c} {a, b, c} {a}
The feasible set {a, b, c} admits exactly two S-stable sets, {a, b, c} itself and {a}. The
latter holds because S({a}) = {a} (internal stability) and S({a, b}) = S({a, c}) = {a}
(external stability). All other feasible sets X admit unique S-stable sets, which coincide
with S(X). Hence, Ŝ is well-defined and given by the entries in the rightmost column
of the table. Since S 6= Ŝ, S fails to be stable. Ŝ, on the other hand, satisfies stability.
Choice functions are usually evaluated by checking whether they satisfy choice
consistency conditions that relate choices from different feasible sets to each other.
The following two properties, α̂ and γ̂, are set-based variants of Sen’s α and γ
(Sen, 1971). α̂ is a rather prominent choice-theoretic condition, also known as
Chernoff’s postulate 5∗ (Chernoff, 1954), the strong superset property (Bordes, 1979), out-
cast (Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995), and the attention filter axiom (Masatlioglu et al.,
2012).3
3We refer to Monjardet (2008) for a more thorough discussion of the origins of this condition.
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Definition 2. A choice function S satisfies α̂ if for all feasible sets B and C,
S(B) ⊆ C ⊆ B implies S(C) = S(B). (α̂)
A choice function S satisfies γ̂ if for all feasible sets B and C,
S(B) = S(C) implies S(B) = S(B ∪ C). (γ̂)
It has been shown that stability is equivalent to the conjunction of α̂ and γ̂.
Theorem 1 (Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011). A choice function is stable if and only if
it satisfies α̂ and γ̂.
Hence, a choice function S is stable if and only if for all feasible sets B, C, and X
with X ⊆ B ∩C,
X = S(B) and X = S(C) if and only if X = S(B ∪C).
Stability, α̂, and γ̂ are illustrated in Figure 1.
For a finer analysis, we split α̂ and γ̂ into two conditions (Brandt and Harrenstein,
2011, Remark 1).
Definition 3. A choice function S satisfies
• α̂
⊆
if for all B,C, it holds that S(B) ⊆ C ⊆ B implies S(C) ⊆ S(B),4
• α̂
⊇
if for all B,C, it holds that S(B) ⊆ C ⊆ B implies S(C) ⊇ S(B),
• γ̂
⊆
if for all B,C, it holds that S(B) = S(C) implies S(B) ⊆ S(B ∪ C), and
• γ̂
⊇
if for all B,C, it holds that S(B) = S(C) implies S(B) ⊇ S(B ∪ C).
Obviously, for any choice function S we have
S satisfies α̂ if and only if S satisfies α̂
⊆
and α̂
⊇
, and
S satisfies γ̂ if and only if S satisfies γ̂
⊆
and γ̂
⊇
.
A choice function is idempotent if the choice set is invariant under repeated application
of the choice function, i.e., S(S(A)) = S(A) for all feasible sets A. It is easily seen that
α̂
⊇
is stronger than idempotency since S(S(A)) ⊇ S(A) implies S(S(A)) = S(A).
Figure 2 shows the logical relationships between stability and its weakenings.
4α̂
⊆
has also been called the Aı¨zerman property or the weak superset property (e.g., Laslier, 1997;
Brandt, 2011).
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Figure 2: Logical relationships between choice-theoretic properties.
3. Generators of Stable Choice Functions
We say that a choice function S′ generates a stable choice function S if S = Ŝ′. Under-
standing stable choice functions can be reduced to understanding their generators. It
turns out that important generators of stable choice functions are simple choice func-
tions, i.e., choice functions S′ with |S′(A)| ≥ |A|−1 for all A. In fact, every stable choice
function S is generated by a unique simple choice function. To this end, we define the
root of a choice function S as
⌈S⌉(A) =
{
S(A) if |S(A)| = |A| − 1,
A otherwise.
Not only does ⌈S⌉ generate S, but any choice function sandwiched between S and ⌈S⌉
is a generator of S.
Theorem 2. Let S and S′ be choice functions such that S is stable and S ⊆ S′ ⊆ ⌈S⌉.
Then, Ŝ′ is well-defined and Ŝ′ = S. In particular, S is generated by the simple choice
function ⌈S⌉.
Proof. We first show that any S-stable set is also S′-stable. Suppose that a set X ⊆ A is
S-stable in A. Then S(X) = X, and a 6∈ S(X∪{a}) for all a ∈ A\X. Since S satisfies α̂,
we have S(X ∪ {a}) = X and therefore ⌈S⌉(X ∪ {a}) = X for all a ∈ A\X. Using the
inclusion relationship S ⊆ S′ ⊆ ⌈S⌉, we find that S′(X) = X and S′(X ∪ {a}) = X for
all a ∈ A\X. Hence, X is S′-stable in A.
Next, we show that every S′-stable set contains an S-stable set. Suppose that a set
X ⊆ A is S′-stable in A. Then S′(X) = X and a 6∈ S′(X ∪ {a}) for all a ∈ A\X.
Using the relation S ⊆ S′, we find that a 6∈ S(X ∪ {a}) for all a ∈ A\X. We will
show that S(X) ⊆ X is S-stable in A. Since S satisfies α̂, we have S(S(X)) = S(X)
and S(X ∪ {a}) = S(X) for all a ∈ A\X. It remains to show that b 6∈ S(S(X) ∪ {b})
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for all b ∈ A\S(X). If b ∈ A\X, we already have that S(X ∪ {b}) = S(X) and
therefore S(S(X) ∪ {b}) = S(X) by α̂. Otherwise, if b ∈ X\S(X), α̂ again implies that
S(S(X) ∪ {b}) = S(X).
Since S is stable, for any feasible set A there exists a unique minimal S-stable set in A,
which is given by S(A) = Ŝ(A). From what we have shown, this set is also S′-stable, and
moreover any S′-stable set contains an S-stable set which in turn contains S(A). Hence
S(A) is also the unique minimal S′-stable set in A. This implies that Ŝ′ is well-defined
and Ŝ′ = Ŝ = S.
Theorem 2 entails that in order to understand stable choice functions, we only need
to understand the circumstances under which a single alternative is discarded.5
An important question is which simple choice functions are roots of stable choice
functions. It follows from the definition of root functions that any root of a stable
choice function needs to satisfy α̂. This condition is, however, not sufficient as it is
easy to construct a simple choice function S that satisfies α̂ such that Ŝ violates α̂.
Nevertheless, the theorem implies that the number of stable choice functions can be
bounded by counting the number of simple choice functions that satisfy α̂. The number
of simple choice functions for a universe of size n ≥ 2 is only
∏n
i=2(i + 1)
(ni), compared
to
∏n
i=2(2
i − 1)(
n
i) for arbitrary choice functions.
In order to give a complete characterization of choice functions that generate stable
choice functions, we need to introduce a new property. A choice function S satisfies local
α̂ if minimal S-stable sets are invariant under removing outside alternatives.6
Definition 4. A choice function S satisfies local α̂ if for any sets X ⊆ Y ⊆ Z such that
X is minimally S-stable in Z, we have that X is also minimally S-stable in Y .
Recall that a choice function S satisfies α̂
⊆
if for any sets A,B such that S(A) ⊆ B ⊆
A, we have S(B) ⊆ S(A). In particular, every simple choice function satisfies α̂
⊆
. We
will provide a characterization of choice functions S satisfying α̂
⊆
such that Ŝ is stable.
First we need the following (known) lemma.
Lemma 1 (Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011). Let S be a choice function such that Ŝ is
well-defined. Then Ŝ satisfies γ̂.
Theorem 3. Let S be a choice function satisfying α̂
⊆
. Then Ŝ is stable if and only if
Ŝ is well-defined and S satisfies local α̂.
5Together with Theorem 3, Theorem 2 also implies that, for any stable tournament solution S, ⌈S⌉ is
a coarsest generator of S. When only considering generators that satisfy α̂
⊆
, ⌈S⌉ is also the coarsest
generator of S. In addition, since simple choice functions trivially satisfy α̂
⊆
, the two theorems imply
that ⌈S⌉ is the unique simple choice function generating S.
6It can be checked that we obtain an equivalent condition even if we require that all outside alternatives
have to be removed. When defining local α̂ in this way, it can be interpreted as some form of
transitivity of stability: stable sets of minimally stable sets are also stable within the original feasible
set (cf. Brandt, 2011, Lem. 3).
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Proof. For the direction from right to left, suppose that Ŝ is well-defined and S satisfies
local α̂. Then Lemma 1 implies that Ŝ satisfies γ̂. Moreover, it follows directly from
local α̂ and the fact that Ŝ is well-defined that Ŝ satisfies α̂. Hence, Ŝ is stable.
For the converse direction, suppose that Ŝ is stable. We first show that Ŝ is well-
defined. Every feasible set A contains at least one S-stable set because otherwise Ŝ is
not a choice function. Next, suppose for contradiction that there exists a feasible set that
contains two distinct minimal S-stable sets. Consider such a feasible set A of minimum
size, and pick any two distinct minimal S-stable sets in A, which we denote by B and C.
If |B\C| = |C\B| = 1, then α̂
⊆
implies S(B ∪C) = B = C, a contradiction. Otherwise,
assume without loss of generality that |C\B| ≥ 2, and pick x, y ∈ C\B with x 6= y. Then
A\{x} contains a unique minimal S-stable set. As B is also S-stable in A\{x}, it follows
that Ŝ(A\{x}) ⊆ B. Since Ŝ satisfies α̂, we have Ŝ(A\{x}) = Ŝ(A\{x, y}). Similarly,
we have Ŝ(A\{y}) = Ŝ(A\{x, y}). But then γ̂ implies that Ŝ(A) = Ŝ(A\{x, y}) ⊆ A,
which contradicts the fact that C is minimal S-stable in A.
We now show that S satisfies local α̂. Since Ŝ is well-defined, minimal S-stable sets
are unique and given by Ŝ. Since Ŝ satisfies α̂, minimal S-stable sets are invariant under
deleting outside alternatives. Hence, S satisfies local α̂, as desired.
Remark 1. Theorem 3 does not hold without the condition that S satisfies α̂
⊆
. To
this end, let U = {a, b, c}, S({a, b, c}) = {b}, and S(X) = X for all other feasible sets
X. Then both {a, b} and {b, c} are minimally S-stable in {a, b, c}, implying that Ŝ is
not well-defined. On the other hand, Ŝ is trivial and therefore also stable. This example
also shows that a generator of a stable choice function needs not be sandwiched between
the choice function and its root.
Combining Theorem 3 with Theorem 1, we obtain the following characterization.
Corollary 1. Let S be a choice function satisfying α̂
⊆
. Then,
Ŝ is stable if and only if
̂̂
S is well-defined and
̂̂
S = Ŝ
if and only if Ŝ satisfies α̂ and γ̂
if and only if Ŝ is well-defined and S satisfies local α̂.
Since simple choice functions trivially satisfy α̂
⊆
, this corollary completely character-
izes which simple choice functions generate stable choice functions.
4. Tournament Solutions
We now turn to the important special case of choice functions whose output depends on
a binary relation.
4.1. Preliminaries
A tournament T is a pair (A,≻), where A is a feasible set and ≻ is a connex and asym-
metric (and thus irreflexive) binary relation on A, usually referred to as the dominance
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relation. Intuitively, a ≻ b signifies that alternative a is preferable to alternative b. The
dominance relation can be extended to sets of alternatives by writing X ≻ Y when a ≻ b
for all a ∈ X and b ∈ Y .
For a tournament T = (A,≻) and an alternative a ∈ A, we denote by
D(a) = {x ∈ A | x ≻ a }
the dominators of a and by
D(a) = {x ∈ A | a ≻ x }
the dominion of a. When varying the tournament, we will refer to DT ′(a) and DT ′(a) for
some tournament T ′ = (A′,≻′). An alternative a is said to cover another alternative b if
D(b) ⊆ D(a). It is said to be a Condorcet winner if it dominates all other alternatives,
and a Condorcet loser if it is dominated by all other alternatives. The order of a
tournament T = (A,≻) is denoted by |T | = |A|. A tournament is regular if the dominator
set and the dominion set of each alternative are of the same size, i.e., for all a ∈ A we
have |D(a)| = |D(a)|. It is easily seen that regular tournaments are always of odd order.
A tournament solution is a function that maps a tournament to a nonempty subset of
its alternatives. We assume that tournament solutions are invariant under tournament
isomorphisms. For every fixed tournament, a tournament solution yields a choice func-
tion. A tournament solution is trivial if it returns all alternatives of every tournament.
Three common tournament solutions are the top cycle, the uncovered set, and the
Banks set. For a given tournament (A,≻), the top cycle (TC ) is the (unique) smallest
set B ⊆ A such that B ≻ A \ B, the uncovered set (UC ) contains all alternatives that
are not covered by another alternative, and the Banks set (BA) contains all alternatives
that are Condorcet winners of inclusion-maximal transitive subtournaments.
For two tournament solutions S and S′, we write S′ ⊆ S, and say that S′ is a refinement
of S and S a coarsening of S′, if S′(T ) ⊆ S(T ) for all tournaments T . The following
inclusions are well-known:
BA ⊆ UC ⊆ TC .
To simplify notation, we will often identify a (sub)tournament by its set of alternatives
when the dominance relation is clear from the context. For example, for a tournament
solution S and a subset of alternatives X ⊆ A in a tournament T = (A,≻) we will write
S(X) for S(T |X).
The definitions of stability and other choice consistency conditions directly carry over
from choice functions to tournament solutions by requiring that the given condition
should be satisfied by every choice function induced by the tournament solution and a
tournament. We additionally consider the following desirable properties of tournament
solutions, all of which are standard conditions in the literature.
Monotonicity requires that a chosen alternative will still be chosen when its dominion
is enlarged, while leaving everything else unchanged.
Definition 5. A tournament solution is monotonic if for all T = (A,≻), T ′ = (A,≻′),
a ∈ A such that ≻A\{a} = ≻
′
A\{a} and for all b ∈ A \ {a}, a ≻
′ b whenever a ≻ b,
a ∈ S(T ) implies a ∈ S(T ′).
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Regularity requires that all alternatives are chosen from regular tournaments.
Definition 6. A tournament solution is regular if S(T ) = A for all regular tournaments
T = (A,≻).
Even though regularity is often considered in the context of tournament solutions, it
does not possess the normative appeal of other conditions.
Finally, we consider a structural invariance property that is based on components of
similar alternatives and, loosely speaking, requires that a tournament solution chooses
the “best” alternatives from the “best” components. A component is a nonempty subset
of alternatives B ⊆ A that bear the same relationship to any alternative not in the set,
i.e., for all a ∈ A\B, either B ≻ {a} or {a} ≻ B. A decomposition of T is a partition of
A into components.
For a given tournament T˜ , a new tournament T can be constructed by replacing each
alternative with a component. Let B1, . . . , Bk be pairwise disjoint sets of alternatives and
consider tournaments T1 = (B1,≻1), . . . , Tk = (Bk,≻k), and T˜ = ({1, . . . , k}, ≻˜). The
product of T1, . . . , Tk with respect to T˜ , denoted by
∏
(T˜ , T1, . . . , Tk), is the tournament
T = (A,≻) such that A =
⋃k
i=1Bi and for all b1 ∈ Bi, b2 ∈ Bj ,
b1 ≻ b2 if and only if i = j and b1 ≻i b2, or i 6= j and i ≻˜ j.
Here, T˜ is called the summary of T with respect to the above decomposition.
Definition 7. A tournament solution is composition-consistent if for all tournaments
T, T1, . . . , Tk and T˜ such that T =
∏
(T˜ , T1, . . . , Tk),
S(T ) =
⋃
i∈S(T˜ )
S(Ti).
All of the three tournament solutions we briefly introduced above satisfy monotonic-
ity. TC and UC are regular, UC and BA are composition-consistent, and only TC is
stable. For more thorough treatments of tournament solutions, see Laslier (1997) and
Brandt et al. (2016).
4.2. The Bipartisan set and the Tournament Equilibrium Set
We now define two tournament solutions that are central to this paper. The first one, the
bipartisan set, generalizes the notion of a Condorcet winner to probability distributions
over alternatives. The skew-adjacency matrix G(T ) = (gab)a,b∈A of a tournament T is
defined by letting
gab =

1 if a ≻ b
−1 if b ≻ a
0 if a = b.
The skew-adjacency matrix can be interpreted as a symmetric zero-sum game in which
there are two players, one choosing rows and the other choosing columns, and in
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which the matrix entries are the payoffs of the row player. Laffond et al. (1993b) and
Fisher and Ryan (1995) have shown independently that every such game admits a unique
mixed Nash equilibrium, which moreover is symmetric. Let pT ∈ ∆(A) denote the mixed
strategy played by both players in equilibrium. Then, pT is the unique probability dis-
tribution such that ∑
a,b∈A
pT (a)q(b)gab ≥ 0 for all q ∈ ∆(A).
In other words, there is no other probability distribution that is more likely to yield a
better alternative than pT . Laffond et al. (1993b) defined the bipartisan set BP(T ) of T
as the support of pT .
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Definition 8. The bipartisan set (BP) of a given tournament T = (A,≻) is defined as
BP(T ) = {a ∈ A | pT (a) > 0}.
BP satisfies stability, monotonicity, regularity, and composition-consistency. More-
over, BP ⊆ UC and BP can be computed in polynomial time by solving a linear feasi-
bility problem.
The next tournament solution, the tournament equilibrium set, was defined by
Schwartz (1990). Given a tournament T = (A,≻) and a tournament solution S, a
nonempty subset of alternatives X ⊆ A is called S-retentive if S(D(x)) ⊆ X for all
x ∈ X such that D(x) 6= ∅.
Definition 9. The tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) of a given tournament T = (A,≻)
is defined recursively as the union of all inclusion-minimal TEQ-retentive sets in T .
This is a proper recursive definition because the cardinality of the set of dominators of
an alternative in a particular set is always smaller than the cardinality of the set itself.
BP and TEQ coincide on all tournaments of order 5 or less (Brandt et al., 2015).8
Schwartz (1990) showed that TEQ ⊆ BA and conjectured that every tournament con-
tains a unique inclusion-minimal TEQ-retentive set, which was later shown to be equiv-
alent to TEQ satisfying any one of a number of desirable properties for tournament
solutions including stability and monotonicity (Laffond et al., 1993a; Houy, 2009a,b;
Brandt et al., 2014; Brandt, 2011; Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011; Brandt, 2015). This
conjecture was disproved by Brandt et al. (2013), who have non-constructively shown
the existence of a counterexample with about 10136 alternatives using the probabilistic
method. Since it was shown that TEQ satisfies the above mentioned desirable proper-
ties for all tournaments that are smaller than the smallest counterexample to Schwartz’s
conjecture, the search for smaller counterexamples remains an important problem. In
fact, the counterexample found by Brandt et al. (2013) is so large that it has no prac-
tical consequences whatsoever for TEQ . Apart from concrete counterexamples, there is
7The probability distribution pT was independently analyzed by Kreweras (1965), Fishburn (1984),
Felsenthal and Machover (1992), and others. An axiomatic characterization in the context of social
choice was recently given by Brandl et al. (2016).
8It is open whether there are tournaments in which BP and TEQ are disjoint.
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ongoing interest in why and under which circumstances TEQ and a related tournament
solution called the minimal extending set ME = B̂A violate stability (Mnich et al., 2015;
Brandt et al., 2017; Yang, 2016).
Computing the tournament equilibrium set of a given tournament was shown to be
NP-hard and consequently there does not exist an efficient algorithm for this problem
unless P equals NP (Brandt et al., 2010).
5. Stable Tournament Solutions and Their Generators
Tournament solutions comprise an important subclass of choice functions. In this sec-
tion, we examine the consequences of the findings from Sections 2 and 3, in particular
Theorems 1, 2, and 3, for tournament solutions.
Stability is a rather demanding property which is satisfied by only a few tournament
solutions. Three well-known tournament solutions that satisfy stability are the top
cycle TC , the minimal covering set MC defined by MC = ÛC , and the bipartisan set
BP , which is a refinement of MC . By virtue of Theorem 2, any stable tournament
solution is generated by its root ⌈S⌉. For example, ⌈TC ⌉ is a tournament solution
that excludes an alternative if and only if it is the only alternative not contained in
the top cycle (and hence a Condorcet loser). Similarly, one can obtain the roots of
other stable tournament solutions such as MC and BP . In some cases, the generator
that is typically considered for a stable tournament solution is different from its root; for
example, MC is traditionally generated by UC , a refinement of ⌈MC ⌉. Since tournament
solutions are invariant under tournament isomorphisms, a simple tournament solution
may only exclude an alternative a if any automorphism of T maps a to itself. Note
that if a tournament solution S is stable, ⌈S⌉ is different from S unless S is the trivial
tournament solution.
It follows from Theorem 1 that stable tournament solutions satisfy both α̂ and γ̂.
It can be shown that α̂ and γ̂ are independent from each other even in the context of
tournament solutions.
Remark 2. There are tournament solutions that satisfy only one of α̂ and γ̂. Examples
are given in Appendix A.1.
We have shown in Theorem 2 that stable tournament solutions are generated by unique
simple tournament solutions. If we furthermore restrict our attention to monotonic
stable tournament solutions, the following theorem shows that we only need to consider
root solutions that are monotonic.
Theorem 4. A stable tournament solution S is monotonic if and only if ⌈S⌉ is mono-
tonic.
Proof. First, note that monotonicity is equivalent to requiring that unchosen alternatives
remain unchosen when they are weakened. Now, for the direction from left to right,
suppose that S is monotonic. Let T = (A,≻), B = ⌈S⌉(T ), and a ∈ A \B. Since ⌈S⌉ is
simple, we have ⌈S⌉(T ) = B\{a}, and therefore S(T ) = B\{a}. Using the fact that S
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is stable and thus satisfies α̂, we find that S(T |B\{a}) = B\{a}. Let T
′ be a tournament
obtained by weakening a with respect to some alternative in B. Monotonicity of S
entails that a 6∈ S(T ′). Since T |B\{a} = T
′|B\{a}, we have S(T
′|B\{a}) = B\{a}, and α̂
implies that S(T ′) = B\{a} and ⌈S⌉(T ′) = B\{a} as well. This means that a remains
unchosen by ⌈S⌉ in T ′, as desired.
The converse direction even holds for all generators of S (see Brandt, 2011, Prop. 5).
Analogous results do not hold for composition-consistency or regularity.
Theorem 3 characterizes stable choice functions Ŝ using well-definedness of Ŝ and local
α̂ of S. These two properties are independent from each other (and therefore necessary
for the characterization) even in the context of tournament solutions.
Remark 3. There is a tournament solution S that satisfies local α̂, but Ŝ violates α̂.
There is a tournament solution S for which Ŝ is well-defined, but Ŝ is not stable. Ex-
amples are given in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3 generalizes previous statements about stable tournament solutions. Brandt
(2011) studied a particular class of generators defined via qualified subsets and shows
the direction from right to left of Theorem 3 for these generators (Brandt, 2011,
Thm. 4).9 Later, Brandt et al. (2017) proved Theorem 3 for one particular generator
BA (Brandt et al., 2017, Cor. 2).
6. Local Reversal Symmetry
In this section, we introduce a new property of tournament solutions called local reversal
symmetry (LRS ).10 While intuitive by itself, LRS is strongly connected to stability and
can be leveraged to disprove that TEQ is stable and to prove that no refinement of BP
is stable.
For a tournament T , let T a be the tournament whose dominance relation is locally
reversed at alternative a, i.e., T a = (A,≻a) with
i ≻a j if and only if (i ≻ j and a /∈ {i, j}) or (j ≻ i and a ∈ {i, j}).
The effect of local reversals is illustrated in Figure 3. Note that T = (T a)a and (T a)b =(
T b
)a
for all alternatives a and b.
Definition 10. A tournament solution S satisfies local reversal symmetry (LRS ) if for
all tournaments T and alternatives a,
a ∈ S(T ) if and only if a /∈ S(T a).
9Brandt’s proof relies on a lemma that essentially showed that the generators he considers always satisfy
local α̂.
10The name of this axiom is inspired by a social choice criterion called reversal symmetry. Reversal
symmetry prescribes that a uniquely chosen alternative has to be unchosen when the preferences of
all voters are reversed (Saari and Barney, 2003). A stronger axiom, called ballot reversal symme-
try, which demands that the choice set is inverted when all preferences are reversed was recently
introduced by Duddy et al. (2014).
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a b
cd
T
a b
cd
T a
Figure 3: Local reversals of tournament T at alternative a result in T a. BP(T ) =
TEQ(T ) = {a, b, d} and BP(T a) = TEQ(T a) = {b}.
LRS can be naturally split into two properties, LRSIN and LRSOUT . LRSIN cor-
responds to the direction from right to left in the above equivalence and requires that
unchosen alternatives are chosen when all incident edges are reversed. LRSOUT corre-
sponds to the direction from left to right and requires that chosen alternatives are not
chosen when all incident edges are reversed.
It follows directly from the definition that LRSIN (resp. LRSOUT ) of a tournament
solution S carries over to any tournament solution that is a coarsening (resp. refinement)
of S.
Lemma 2. Let S and S′ be two tournament solutions such that S ⊆ S′. If S satisfies
LRSIN , then so does S
′. Conversely, if S′ satisfies LRSOUT , then so does S.
There is an unexpected strong relationship between the purely choice-theoretic con-
dition of stability and LRS .
Theorem 5. Every stable tournament solution satisfies LRSIN .
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that S is stable but violates LRSIN . Then there exists
a tournament T = (A,≻) and an alternative a ∈ A such that a /∈ S(T ) and a /∈ S(T a).
Let T ′ = (A′,≻′), where A′ = X ∪ Y and each of T ′|X and T
′|Y is isomorphic to
T |A\{a}. Also, partition X = X1 ∪X2 and Y = Y1 ∪ Y2, where X1 and Y1 consist of the
alternatives that are mapped to DT (a) by the isomorphism. To complete the definition
of T ′, we add the relations X1 ≻
′ Y2, Y2 ≻
′ X2, X2 ≻
′ Y1, and Y1 ≻
′ X1. The structure
of tournament T ′ is depicted in Figure 4.
We claim that both X and Y are externally S-stable in T ′. To this end, we note that
for every alternative x ∈ X (resp. y ∈ Y ) the subtournament T |Y ∪{x} (resp. T |X∪{y})
is isomorphic either to T or to T a, with x (resp. y) being mapped to a. By assumption,
a is neither chosen in T nor in T a, and therefore X and Y are both externally S-stable
in T ′.
Now, suppose that S(X ∪ {y}) = X ′ ⊆ X for some y ∈ Y . Note that X ′ 6= ∅
because tournament solutions always return non-empty sets. Since S satisfies α̂, we
have S(X) = X ′. Hence, S(X) = X ′ = S(X ∪ {y}) for all y ∈ Y . Since S satisfies γ̂,
we also have S(X ∪ Y ) = X ′. Similarly, we can deduce that S(X ∪ Y ) = Y ′ for some
∅ 6= Y ′ ⊆ Y . This yields the desired contradiction.
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X1
X2
Y1
Y2
X Y
Figure 4: Construction of a tournament T ′ with two S-stable sets X and Y used in the
proof of Theorem 5.
6.1. Disproving Stability
As discussed in Section 4, disproving that a tournament solution satisfies stability can
be very difficult. By virtue of Theorem 5, it now suffices to show that the tournament
solution violates LRSIN . For TEQ , this leads to the first concrete tournament in which
TEQ violates stability. With the help of a computer, we found a minimal tournament in
which TEQ violates LRSIN using exhaustive search. This tournament is of order 13 and
thereby lies exactly at the boundary of the class of tournaments for which exhaustive
search is possible. Using the construction explained in the proof of Theorem 5, we thus
obtain a tournament of order 24 in which TEQ violates γ̂. This tournament consists of
two disjoint isomorphic subtournaments of order 12 both of which are TEQ-retentive.
Theorem 6. TEQ violates LRSIN .
Proof. We define a tournament T = ({x1, . . . , x13},≻) such that x13 6∈ TEQ(T ) and
x13 6∈ TEQ(T
x13). The dominator sets in T are defined as follows:
D(x1) = {x4, x5, x6, x8, x9, x12}, D(x2) = {x1, x6, x7, x10, x12},
D(x3) = {x1, x2, x6, x7, x9, x10}, D(x4) = {x2, x3, x7, x8, x11},
D(x5) = {x2, x3, x4, x8, x10, x11}, D(x6) = {x4, x5, x9, x11, x12},
D(x7) = {x1, x5, x6, x11, x12, x13}, D(x8) = {x2, x3, x6, x7, x12, x13},
D(x9) = {x2, x4, x5, x7, x8, x13}, D(x10) = {x1, x4, x6, x7, x8, x9, x13},
D(x11) = {x1, x2, x3, x8, x9, x10, x13}, D(x12) = {x3, x4, x5, x9, x10, x11, x13},
D(x13) = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}.
A rather tedious check reveals that
TEQ(D(x1)) = {x4, x8, x12}, TEQ(D(x2)) = {x6, x10, x12},
TEQ(D(x3)) = {x6, x7, x9}, TEQ(D(x4)) = {x2, x7, x11},
TEQ(D(x5)) = {x2, x8, x10}, TEQ(D(x6)) = {x4, x9, x11},
TEQ(D(x7)) = {x1, x5, x11}, TEQ(D(x8)) = {x3, x6, x12},
TEQ(D(x9)) = {x2, x5, x7}, TEQ(D(x10)) = {x4, x6, x7},
TEQ(D(x11)) = {x1, x2, x8}, and TEQ(D(x12)) = {x3, x4, x9}.
It can then be checked that TEQ(T ) = TEQ(T x13) = {x1, . . . , x12}.
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Let nTEQ be the greatest natural number n such that all tournaments of order n or
less admit a unique inclusion-minimal TEQ-retentive set. Together with earlier results
by Brandt et al. (2010) and Yang (2016), we now have that 14 ≤ nTEQ ≤ 23.
The tournament used in the preceding proof does not show that ME (or BA) violate
LRSIN . A computer search for such tournaments was unsuccessful. While it is known
that ME violates stability, a concrete counterexample thus remains elusive.
6.2. Most Discriminating Stable Tournament Solutions
An important property of tournament solutions that is not captured by any of the axioms
introduced in Section 4.1 is discriminative power.11 It is known that BA and MC (and
by the known inclusions also UC and TC ) almost always select all alternatives when
tournaments are drawn uniformly at random and the number of alternatives goes to
infinity (Fey, 2008; Scott and Fey, 2012).12 Experimental results suggest that the same
is true for TEQ . Other tournament solutions, which are known to return small choice
sets, fail to satisfy stability and composition-consistency. A challenging question is how
discriminating tournament solutions can be while still satisfying desirable axioms.
LRS reveals an illuminating dichotomy in this context for common tournament so-
lutions. We state without proof that discriminating tournament solutions such as
Copeland’s rule, Slater’s rule, and Markov’s rule satisfy LRSOUT and violate LRSIN .
On the other hand, coarse tournament solutions such as TC , UC , and MC satisfy
LRSIN and violate LRSOUT . The bipartisan set hits the sweet spot because it is the
only one among the commonly considered tournament solutions that satisfies LRSIN and
LRSOUT (and hence LRS ).
Theorem 7. BP satisfies LRS.
Proof. Since BP is stable, Theorem 5 implies that BP satisfies LRSIN . Now, assume
for contradiction that BP violates LRSOUT , i.e., there is a tournament T = (A,≻) and
an alternative a such that a ∈ BP(T ) and a ∈ BP(T a). For a probability distribution p
and a subset of alternatives B ⊆ A, let p(B) =
∑
x∈B p(x). Consider the optimal mixed
strategy pT |A\{a} in tournament T |A\{a}. It is known from Laslier (1997, Prop. 6.4.8)
that a ∈ BP(T ) if and only if pT |A\{a}(D(a)) > pT |A\{a}(D(a)). For T
a, we thus have
that pTa|A\{a}(D(a)) > pTa|A\{a}(D(a)). This is a contradiction because DT (a) = DTa(a)
and DT (a) = DTa(a).
The relationship between LRS and the discriminative power of tournament solutions
is no coincidence. To see this, consider all labeled tournaments of fixed order and an
arbitrary alternative a. LRSIN demands that a is chosen in at least one of T and T
a
11To see that discriminative power is not captured by the axioms, observe that the trivial tournament
solution satisfies stability, monotonicity, regularity, and composition-consistency.
12However, these analytic results stand in sharp contrast to empirical observations that Condorcet
winners are likely to exist in real-world settings, which implies that tournament solutions are much
more discriminative than results for the uniform distribution suggest (Brandt and Seedig, 2016).
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while LRSOUT requires that a is chosen in at most one of T and T
a. We thus obtain
the following consequences.
• A tournament solution satisfying LRSIN chooses on average at least half of the
alternatives.
• A tournament solution satisfying LRSOUT chooses on average at most half of the
alternatives.
• A tournament solution satisfying LRS chooses on average half of the alternatives.
Hence, the well-known fact that BP chooses on average half of the alternatives
(Fisher and Reeves, 1995) follows from Theorem 7. Also, all coarsenings of BP such
as MC , UC , and TC satisfy LRSIN by virtue of Lemma 2. On the other hand, since
these tournament solutions are all different from BP , they choose on average more than
half of the alternatives and hence cannot satisfy LRSOUT .
These results already hint at BP being perhaps a “most discriminating” stable tour-
nament solution. In order to make this precise, we formally define the discriminative
power of a tournament solution. For two tournament solutions S and S′, we say that
S is more discriminating than S′ if there is n ∈ N such that the average number of
alternatives chosen by S is lower than that of S′ over all labeled tournaments of order
n. Note that this definition is very weak because we only have an existential, not a
universal, quantifier for n. It is therefore even possible that two tournament solutions
are more discriminating than each other. However, this only strengthens the following
results. Combining Theorems 5 and 7 immediately yields the following theorem.
Theorem 8. A stable tournament solution satisfies LRS if and only if there is no more
discriminating stable tournament solution.
Proof. First consider the direction from left to right. Let S be a tournament solution
that satisfies LRS . Due to the observations made above, S chooses on average half of
the alternatives. Since any stable tournament solution satisfies LRSIN by Theorem 5,
it chooses on average at least half of the alternatives and therefore cannot be more
discriminating than S.
Now consider the direction from right to left. Let S be a most discriminating stable
tournament solution. Again, since any stable tournament solution satisfies LRSIN , S
chooses on average at least half of the alternatives. On the other hand, BP is a stable
tournament solution that chooses on average exactly half of the alternatives. This means
that S must also choose on average half of the alternatives, implying that it also satisfies
LRSOUT and hence LRS .
Corollary 2. There is no more discriminating stable tournament solution than BP. In
particular, there is no stable refinement of BP.
Given Corollary 2, a natural question is whether every stable tournament solution
that satisfies mild additional properties such as monotonicity is a coarsening of BP . We
give an example in Appendix A.4 which shows that this is not true.
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Finally, we provide two axiomatic characterizations of BP by leveraging other tradi-
tional properties. These characterizations leverage the following lemma, which entails
that, in order to show that two stable tournament solutions that satisfy LRS are iden-
tical, it suffices to show that their roots are contained in each other.
Lemma 3. Let S and S′ be two stable tournament solutions satisfying LRS. Then
⌈S⌉ ⊆ ⌈S′⌉ if and only if S = S′.
Proof. Suppose that ⌈S⌉ ⊆ ⌈S′⌉, and consider any tournament T . We will show that
S(T ) ⊆ S′(T ). If S′(T ) = T , this is already the case. Otherwise, we have S′(S′(T ) ∪
{a}) = S′(T ) for each a 6∈ S′(T ). By definition of the root function, ⌈S′⌉(S′(T )∪{a}) =
S′(T ). Since the root function excludes at most one alternative from any tournament,
we also have ⌈S⌉(S′(T )∪{a}) = S′(T ) by our assumption ⌈S⌉ ⊆ ⌈S′⌉. Hence S(S′(T )∪
{a}) = S′(T ) as well. Using γ̂ of S, we find that S(T ) = S′(T ). So S(T ) ⊆ S′(T ) for
every tournament T . However, since S and S′ satisfy LRS , and therefore choose on
average half of the alternatives, we must have S = S′.
Finally, if S = S′, then clearly ⌈S⌉ = ⌈S′⌉ and so ⌈S⌉ ⊆ ⌈S′⌉.
Theorem 9. BP is the only tournament solution that satisfies stability, composition-
consistency, monotonicity, regularity, and LRS.
Proof. Let S be a tournament solution satisfying the five aforementioned properties.
Since S and BP are stable and satisfy LRS , by Lemma 3 it suffices to show that ⌈S⌉ ⊆
⌈BP⌉. This is equivalent to showing that when ⌈BP⌉ excludes an alternative from a
tournament, then ⌈S⌉ excludes the same alternative. In other words, we need to show
that when BP excludes exactly one alternative a, then S also only excludes a.
Let T be a tournament in which BP excludes exactly one alternative a. As defined
in Section 4.2, BP(T ) corresponds to the support of the unique Nash equilibrium of
G(T ). Laffond et al. (1993b) and Fisher and Ryan (1995) have shown that this support
is always of odd size and that the equilibrium weights associated to the alternatives
in BP(T ) are odd numbers. Hence, using composition-consistency of BP and the fact
that the value of a symmetric zero-sum game is zero, T can be transformed into a
new (possibly larger) tournament T1 = (A,≻) by replacing each alternative except a
with a regular tournament of odd order such that T1|A\{a} is regular. Moreover, in T1,
|D(a)| > |A|2 .
We will now show that a 6∈ S(T1). Since S is monotonic, it suffices to prove this when
we strengthen a arbitrarily against alternatives in T1 until |D(a)| =
|A|+1
2 .
Let X = D(a) and Y = D(a), and let T2 be a tournament obtained by adding a new
alternative b to T1 so that X ≻ {b} ≻ Y and a ≻ b. Note that T2 is again a regular
tournament, so S(T2) = A ∪ {b}. In particular, b ∈ S(T2).
Let T3 = (T2)
b be the tournament obtained from T2 by reversing all edges incident to
b. By LRSOUT , we have b 6∈ S(T3). If it were the case that a ∈ S(T3), then it should
remain chosen when we reverse the edge between a and b. However, alternative a in the
tournament after reversing the edge is isomorphic to alternative b in T3, and so we must
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b
Figure 5: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 9. Circled alternatives are contained in
the choice set S(·). Alternatives circled with a dashed line are not contained
in the choice set S(·).
have b ∈ S(T3), a contradiction. Hence a 6∈ S(T3). Since S satisfies stability and thus α̂,
we also have a 6∈ S(T1), as claimed. See Figure 5 for an illustration.
Now, α̂ and regularity of S imply that S(T1) = S(T1|A\{a}) = A\{a}. Since S satisfies
composition-consistency, we also have that S returns all alternatives except a from the
original tournament T , completing our proof.
Based on Theorems 8 and 9, we obtain another characterization that does not involve
LRS and hence only makes use of properties previously considered in the literature.
Corollary 3. BP is the unique most discriminating tournament solution that satisfies
stability, composition-consistency, monotonicity, and regularity.
Proof. Suppose that a tournament solution S satisfies stability, composition-consistency,
monotonicity, and regularity and is as discriminating as BP . By Theorem 5, S satisfies
LRSIN . Since S chooses on average half of the alternatives, it satisfies LRSOUT and
hence LRS as well. Theorem 9 then implies that S = BP .
The only previous characterization of BP that we are aware of was obtained by
Laslier (1997, Thm. 6.3.10) and is based on a rather contrived property called Copeland-
dominance. According to Laslier (1997, p. 153), “this axiomatization of the Bipartisan
set does not add much to our knowledge of the concept because it is merely a re-statement
of previous propositions.” Corollary 3 essentially shows that, for most discriminating
stable tournament solutions, Laslier’s Copeland-dominance is implied by monotonicity
and regularity.
We now address the independence of the axioms used in Theorem 9.
Remark 4. LRS is not implied by the other properties. In fact, the trivial tournament
solution satisfies stability, composition-consistency, monotonicity, and regularity.
Remark 5. Monotonicity is not implied by the other properties. In fact, the tournament
solution that returns BP(T ), where T is the tournament in which all edges in T are
reversed, satisfies stability, composition-consistency, regularity, and LRS .
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The question of whether stability, composition-consistency, and regularity are inde-
pendent in the presence of the other axioms is quite challenging. We can only provide
the following partial answers.
Remark 6. Neither stability nor composition-consistency is implied by LRS , mono-
tonicity, and regularity. In fact, there is a tournament solution that satisfies LRS ,
monotonicity, and regularity, but violates stability and composition-consistency (see
Appendix A.3).
Remark 7. Neither regularity nor composition-consistency is implied by stability and
monotonicity. In fact, there is a tournament solution that satisfies stability and mono-
tonicity, but violates regularity and composition-consistency (see Appendix A.4).
Brandt et al. (2017) brought up the question whether stability implies regularity (un-
der mild assumptions) because all stable tournaments solutions studied prior to this
paper were regular.13 Remark 7 shows that this does not hold without making assump-
tions that go beyond monotonicity.
Given the previous remarks, it is possible that composition-consistency and regularity
are not required for Theorem 9 and Corollary 3. Indeed, our computer experiments
have shown that the only stable and monotonic tournament solution satisfying LRS for
all tournaments of order up to 7 is BP . This may, however, be due to the large num-
ber of automorphisms in small tournaments and composition-consistency and regularity
could be required for larger tournaments. It is also noteworthy that the proof of The-
orem 9 only requires a weak version of composition-consistency, where all components
are tournaments in which all alternatives are returned due to automorphisms.
Since stability is implied by Samuelson’s weak axiom of revealed preference or, equiv-
alently, by transitive rationalizability, Corollary 3 can be seen as an escape from Arrow’s
impossibility theorem where the impossibility is turned into a possibility by weakening
transitive rationalizability and (significantly) strengthening the remaining conditions
(see, also, Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011).
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A. Appendix
A.1. Examples for Remark 2
Brandt and Harrenstein (2011, p. 1729) mention that α̂ and γ̂ are independent from
each other in the context of general choice functions. Here, we prove that the same
holds even in the context of tournament solutions.
Proposition 1. There exists a tournament solution that satisfies α̂, but not γ̂.
Proof. Let S be a stable tournament solution. As mentioned in Section 3, ⌈S⌉ satisfies α̂.
However, it is easily seen that, unless S is trivial, ⌈S⌉ violates γ̂. Hence, the statement
follows from the existence of non-trivial stable tournament solutions (such as BP).
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Proposition 2. There exists a tournament solution that satisfies γ̂, but not α̂.
Proof. Let S be a stable tournament solution. Define the tournament solution S′ such
that for each tournament T = (A,≻),
S′(T ) =
{
S(T ) if |A \ S(T )| > 1
A otherwise.
It can be shown that S′ satisfies γ̂, but may violate α̂. For the latter, let S = TC and
consider a transitive tournament ({a, b, c},≻) such that a ≻ b, b ≻ c, and a ≻ c. By
definition, S′({a, b, c}) = {a}, but S′({a, b}) = {a, b}.
A.2. Examples for Remark 3
BA satisfies local α̂, but B̂A =ME violates α̂ (Brandt et al., 2017).
Similarly, there exists a tournament solution S for which Ŝ is well-defined, but Ŝ is
not stable. For a stable tournament solution S, we have by definition that S = Ŝ and
hence that Ŝ is also stable. The following proposition shows that α̂ does not carry over
from S to Ŝ even if S is simple and Ŝ is well-defined.
Proposition 3. There exists a simple tournament solution S satisfying α̂ such that Ŝ
is well-defined but Ŝ does not satisfy α̂.
Proof. Let S be the tournament solution that always chooses all alternatives, with two
exceptions:
• If the tournament is of order 2, then S chooses only the Condorcet winner.
• If the tournament is the tournament T4 given in Figure 6, then S chooses alterna-
tives a, b, and c.
a b
cd
Figure 6: Tournament T4.
Clearly, S is simple and satisfies α̂. Since Ŝ chooses alternatives a, b, and c from T4,
but chooses only the Condorcet winner from the transitive tournament of order 3, it
does not satisfy α̂.
It remains to show that Ŝ is well-defined. One can check that every tournament
contains an S-stable set. Suppose for contradiction that some tournament T contains
two distinct minimal S-stable sets, which we denote by B and C. Then B and C are
also S-stable in B ∪ C. If B is a singleton, then B is the Condorcet winner in B ∪ C,
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which means C cannot be S-stable, a contradiction. Hence both B and C are transitive
tournaments of order 3, and 4 ≤ |B∪C| ≤ 6. One can check all the possibilities of B∪C
to conclude that this case is also impossible.
For the tournament solution S defined in the proof of Proposition 3, we have that
̂̂
S
is not well-defined. Even though no tournament contains two distinct minimal Ŝ-stable
sets, T4 does not contain any Ŝ-stable set. This example also shows that for a tournament
solution S′, Ŝ′ may fail to be well-defined not because it allows two distinct minimal
S′-stable sets in a tournament but because some tournament contains no S′-stable set.
A.3. Example for Remark 6
We show that there exists a tournament solution different from BP that satisfies LRS ,
monotonicity, regularity, and Condorcet consistency.
To this end, we define a new tournament solution called POS which chooses all alter-
natives with positive relative degree. More precisely, an alternative is chosen by POS if
it dominates strictly more than half of the remaining alternatives, is not chosen if it dom-
inates strictly less than half of the remaining alternatives, and goes to a “tie-break” to
determine whether it is chosen if it dominates exactly half of the remaining alternatives.
For tournaments of even size, POS chooses exactly the alternatives that dominate at
least (or equivalently, more than) half of the remaining alternatives. Hence we do not
need a tie-break for tournaments of even size. The tie-breaking rule for tournaments of
odd size 2n + 1 is as follows: For any (unlabeled) tournament T of order 2n and any
partition of it into two sets B and C of size n, consider two tournaments T1 and T2 of
order 2n + 1. The tournament T1 contains T and another alternative a that dominates
B but is dominated by C, while the tournament T2 contains T and another alternative a
that dominates C but is dominated by B. If T1 or T2 is regular, POS chooses a in that
tournament and not in the other one. Otherwise, POS arbitrarily chooses a in exactly
one of T1 and T2.
Proposition 4. POS satisfies LRS, monotonicity, and regularity.
Proof. We need to show that the tie-breaking rule in the definition of POS is well-defined.
First, we show that if we perform a local reversal on alternative a, we do not get an
isomorphic tournament with alternative a mapped to itself. Indeed, if a were mapped
to itself, it would mean that no tournament solution satisfies LRS , which we know is
not true since BP satisfies LRS . Secondly, the tournament obtained by performing a
local reversal on an alternative in a regular tournament is not regular. Hence we do not
obtain a conflict within the tie-breaking rule.
It follows directly from the definition that POS satisfies LRS , monotonicity, and
regularity.
The tournament T4 given in Figure 6 shows that POS violates composition-consistency
and α̂ (and hence stability).
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a b c
d e f
g
Figure 7: Tournament T7. g ≻ {a, b, c}, {d, e, f} ≻ g, and all omitted edges point
downwards.
Interestingly, BP (and all of its coarsenings) always intersect with POS while there
exists a tournament for which BA (and all of its refinements such as TEQ and ME) do
not overlap with POS . This follows from results on the Copeland value by Laffond et al.
(1993b, 1994).
A.4. Example for Remark 7
We construct a tournament solution that satisfies monotonicity and stability, but violates
regularity and composition-consistency.
Every tournament solution has to be regular on tournaments of order 5 or less because
of non-trivial automorphisms. Consider the tournament T7 shown in Figure 7. T7 admits
a unique nontrivial automorphism that maps each of the six alternatives in the two 3-
cycles to the next alternative in its 3-cycle and maps alternative g to itself.14
Now, define the simple tournament solution S7, which always returns all alternatives
unless the tournament is T7 or it can be modified from T7 by weakening alternative g.
In the latter case, S7 returns all alternatives except g.
We check that this definition is sound. First, we know that in T7, there is no au-
tomorphism that maps alternative g to another alternative. When we weaken g, it is
the unique alternative with the smallest out-degree, and hence cannot be mapped by an
automorphism to another alternative. Now, the alternatives a, b, c form an orbit, and S7
excludes g whenever it is dominated by d, e, f (and has any dominance relationship to
a, b, c). This yields four non-isomorphic tournaments for which S7 excludes g.
Proposition 5. Ŝ7 satisfies stability and monotonicity.
Proof. First, observe that S7 trivially satisfies local α̂ because S7 only excludes an alter-
native in tournaments of order 7. By virtue of Theorem 3, it therefore suffices to show
that Ŝ7 is well-defined.
One can check that every tournament contains an S7-stable set. Let T6 denote the
tournament obtained by removing alternative g from T7. Suppose for contradiction that
there exists a tournament T that contains two distinct minimal S7-stable sets, which
14Note that (T7)
g is the smallest tournament in which BA and UC differ (Brandt et al., 2015).
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we denote by B and C. Then B and C are also S7-stable in B ∪ C. Moreover, T |B
must correspond to the tournament T6, and each alternative in C\B either has the same
dominance relation to B as the alternative g does to T6 or has a dominance relation that
is a weakening of g. The same statement holds for C. We consider the following cases.
Case 1 : 10 ≤ |B ∪ C| ≤ 11. The tournament T |B has one of its alternatives corre-
sponding to alternatives d, e, and f in Figure 7 outside of B ∩ C, and this alternative
must dominate all of the alternatives in C. Similarly, there exists an alternative in C\B
that dominates all of the alternatives in B. But this implies that some two alternatives
dominate each other, a contradiction.
Case 2 : 7 ≤ |B ∪ C| ≤ 9. At least one of the two tournaments T |B and T |C must
have all of its alternatives corresponding to alternatives d, e, and f in Figure 7 in the
intersection B ∩ C, for otherwise we obtain a contradiction in the same way as in Case
1. Assume without loss of generality that T |B has its alternatives corresponding to d, e,
and f in the intersection. Hence three alternatives in B ∩C that form a cycle dominate
the same alternative in C. But this does not occur in T6, a contradiction.
It follows from Theorem 4 that Ŝ7 satisfies monotonicity.
Clearly, Ŝ7 is not regular since it excludes an alternative from the regular tournament
T7. Moreover, it is not a coarsening of BP since BP selects all of the alternatives in
T7. Hence we have that stable and monotonic tournament solutions are not necessarily
coarsenings of BP .
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